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Abstract
Fingerprint alteration, also referred to as obfuscation
presentation attack, is to intentionally tamper or damage
the real friction ridge patterns to avoid identification by
an AFIS. This paper proposes a method for detection and
localization of fingerprint alterations. Our main contribu-
tions are: (i) design and train CNN models on fingerprint
images and minutiae-centered local patches in the image to
detect and localize regions of fingerprint alterations, and
(ii) train a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) to syn-
thesize altered fingerprints whose characteristics are simi-
lar to true altered fingerprints. A successfully trained GAN
can alleviate the limited availability of altered fingerprint
images for research. A database of 4, 815 altered finger-
prints from 270 subjects, and an equal number of rolled fin-
gerprint images are used to train and test our models. The
proposed approach achieves a True Detection Rate (TDR)
of 99.24% at a False Detection Rate (FDR) of 2%, outper-
forming published results. The synthetically generated al-
tered fingerprint dataset will be open-sourced.
1. Introduction
Fingerprints have been used to identify individuals for
more than a century [1]. Being one of the most reliable bio-
metrics, it has been used by law enforcement and forensic
laboratories for background checks, booking suspects, and
crime scene investigations. In addition, homeland security
agencies deploy Automated Fingerprint Identification Sys-
tems (AFIS) for watch list comparisons of passengers ar-
riving at ports of entry and national registry systems for de-
duplication before issuing an ID. While state of the art AFIS
are quite accurate and robust [2], their recognition accuracy
drops when they encounter noisy fingerprint images whose
friction ridges are degraded or destroyed. Intentional or un-
intentional destruction of friction ridge patterns, degrades
the information content of a fingerprint image and therefore
increases the error rate of an AFIS. Intentional fingerprint
alteration, known as “altered fingerprints” (see Fig. 1), are
attempted in hope of obfuscating the true identity to evade
Figure 1: Example images of altered fingerprints. (a) Trans-
planted friction ridge skin from sole, and (b) fingers that
have been bitten. Source: [4].
law enforcement and is a threat to AFIS [3].
The first recorded observation of finger tip skin trans-
plant is by Galton who in 1896 reported his findings in a
“casual” graft of ridged skin. A man had been cutting card-
board with a sharp knife and cut his skin. A piece of skin
was inadvertently sliced off. This piece was immediately
applied to the wound and tightly bandaged. Examination
of the injury (30 years later!) showed that the slip of skin
had been successfully engrafted, though replaced at right
angles to its original direction, as shown by the alignment
of ridges [10]. Cases of tampering with fingerprints to evade
detection in criminal cases were reported as early as 1935.
Cummins [10] reported 3 cases of fingerprint alterations and
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Table 1: Related and previous work on altered fingerprint detection.
Source Method Dataset Performance
Feng, Jain and
Ross [5] orientation field 1,976 simulated altered fingerprints
92% detection rate at false
positive rate of 7%
Tiribuzi et al. [6] minutiae density maps andorientation entropies 1000 genuine and synthetic altered fingerprints 90.4% classification accuracy
Yoon et al. [7, 4] orientation field and minutiaedistribution
4, 433 operational altered fingerprints from 270
subjects
70.2% detection rate at false
positive rate of 2.1%
Ellingsgaard and
Busch [8, 9]
orientation field and minutia
orientation
116 altered and 180 unaltered from various
sources
92.0% detection rate at false
positive rate of 2.3%
Proposed Approach input image and minutiae-basedpatches; CNN models
4,815 altered and 4,815 valid fingerprints from
270 subjects
99.24% detection rate at false
positive rate of 2%
presented images of before and after alterations. In 2018,
Business Insider reported that like many of the FBI’s most
wanted criminals, Eduardo Ravelo, who was added to the
FBI’s 10 Most Wanted list in October 2009, was believed
to have had plastic surgery to alter his fingerprints to evade
authorities [11]. In recent years, border crossing applica-
tions have been targeted by altered fingerprint attacks. In
2009, ABC news reported that Japanese officials arrested
“a Chinese woman who took a particularly extreme mea-
sure to evade detection” [12]. The Chinese woman had paid
a plastic surgeon to swap fingerprints from her right and left
hands. Patches of skin from her thumbs and index fingers
were reportedly removed and then grafted onto the ends of
fingers on the opposite hand. As a result, her identity was
not detected when she re-entered Japan illegally. In 2014,
the FBI identified 412 records in its IAFIS which indicated
deliberate fingerprint alterations [13].
Detection of altered fingerprints is of high interest to law
enforcement and homeland security agencies. This paper
proposes deep learning based approaches to classify input
fingerprint images into two classes: valid or altered finger-
prints, and to localize the regions of a fingerprint that is al-
terated. This can be broadened to assessing the fingerprint-
ness of an input image [4], such that valid fingerprints, or
valid region of fingerprints, shall produce high scores and
altered fingerprints, or altered portion of fingerprints shall
produce low or zero scores.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Previous
works are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
operational valid and altered fingerprints that were used for
training and testing of our network models. Models are ex-
plained in Section 4, along with our synthetic altered finger-
print generation algorithm. Results are presented in Section
5, and finally conclusions and future work are discussed in
Section 6.
2. Related work
Existing approaches for detecting fingerprint alteration
have primarily explored hand crafted features to distin-
guish between altered and valid fingerprints. Feng et al. [5]
trained an SVM to detect irregularities in ridge orientation
field; evaluated their method on 1,976 simulated altered fin-
gerprints; and reported a 92% detection rate at a false pos-
itive rate of 7%. Tiribuzi et al. [6] combined the minutiae
density maps and the orientation entropies of the ridge-flow
in order to identify the altered fingerprints. They reported a
90.4% classification accuracy on a dataset of 1, 000 genuine
and synthetic altered fingerprints. Yoon et al. [7, 4] utilized
the orientation field and minutiae distribution to detect al-
tered fingerprints. Their method was tested on a database
of 4, 433 altered fingerprints from 270 subjects, providing
for 70.2% correctly identified altered fingerprints at a false
positive rate of 2.1%. Ellingsgaard and Busch in [8, 9]
discuss methods for automatically detecting altered finger-
prints based on analyses of two different local characteris-
tics of a fingerprint image: identifying irregularities in the
pixel-wise orientations, and examining minutia orientations
in local patches. They further suggest that alteration detec-
tion should be included into standard quality measures of
fingerprints. Beyond detection of altered fingerprint, Yoon
and Jain [14] investigated feasibility of a state-of-the-art
commercial fingerprint matcher to link altered fingerprints
to their pre-altered mates.
Table 1 summarizes previous work in altered fingerprint
detection. All these methods are based on examining ir-
regularities in orientation flow or minutia maps based on
hand crafted features. Our approach differs from the previ-
ous works by using a deep learning technique to learn and
evaluate salient features.
Research on altered fingerprint detection has been con-
strained with limited availability of data and lack of public
domain altered fingerprint datasets. Furthermore, because
previous works each used a different dataset, comparing
their results is not feasible. To alleviate this problem, we
propose a method to generate synthetic altered fingerprints.
3. Altered Fingerprint Dataset
An operational dataset of 4, 815 altered fingerprints,
from 635 tenprint cards of 270 subjects, acquired from law
enforcement agencies is utilized in this study. The num-
Figure 2: Example of altered and valid fingerprint images
used for training and testing in one of the five folds. The
altered region is highlighted in red. The NFIQ 2.0 quality
scores are also presented for each image; the larger NFIQ
2.0 score, the higher fingerprint quality. The NFIQ 2.0 qual-
ity scores ranges between [0, 100].
ber of tenprint cards per subject varies from 1 to 16 due to
multiple encounters. However, not all 10 fingerprint images
in a tenprint card may be altered. The number of altered
fingerprint instances per subject varies from 1 to 137. An-
other operational dataset of 4, 815 rolled fingerprint images
is used for valid fingerprints. Fingerprint images in both
sets of altered and valid are images collected as part of law
enforcement operations. All images are 8-bits gray scale. A
five-fold cross-validation is employed where in each of the
five folds, the training set contains 3, 852 altered and 3, 852
valid fingerprints. The testing set in each fold contains the
remaining 963 altered and 963 valid fingerprints, such that
the train and test sets are disjoint. Figure 2 shows sample
altered and valid images used for training and testing in one
of the five folds.
4. Proposed Approach
4.1. Altered Fingerprint Detection
The goal of this study is to detect altered fingerprint im-
ages. This can be formulated as a binary classification prob-
lem with two classes; altered and valid. A more sophisti-
cated model would be a multi-class classification that de-
tects the type of alteration, when valid fingerprint has a type
“none”. As shown in Figure 3, different types of alteration
Figure 3: Types of fingerprint alterations: (i) Oblitera-
tion, such as scars, or mutilations, (ii) Distortion, i.e. fric-
tion ridge transplantation to distort friction ridge area, and
(iii) Imitation, i.e. transplantation or removal of friction
ridge skin while still preserving fingerprint like pattern.
procedures would result in different fingerprint degradation.
Different types of alteration procedures and their effect on
friction ridge pattern are discussed in [4] and [8]. Based on
the changes made to friction ridge patterns, they categorized
altered fingerprints into three types: obliteration, distortion,
and imitation.
Obliteration consists of abrading, cutting, burning, ap-
plying strong chemicals, or transplanting friction ridge skin.
Skin disease or side effects of drugs can also obliterate
fingertips. Distortion comprises of cases of using plastic
surgery to convert normal friction ridge pattern into unusual
ridge pattern. Some portions of skin are removed from the
finger and grafted back onto a different position causing an
unusual pattern. Imitation is when surgical procedure is per-
formed in such a way that the altered fingerprints appear
as natural fingerprints, for example, by grafting skin from
the other hand or a toe onto a large or perhaps the entire
finger tip skin such that fingerprint ridge pattern is still pre-
served. While there are distinct alteration types, and despite
Yoon and Jain’s [4] suggestion to develop different models
for different alteration types, we propose to utilize a single
model for the following two reasons: a) insufficient data
for each alteration type for training deep networks, and b)
manual labeling of the alteration type would be subjective
because an image can suffer from more than one alteration
type. We trained a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
to classify an input fingerprint image into one of the two
classes of valid or altered. Data augmentation techniques,
Figure 4: Examples of altered fingerprints and correspond-
ing manually marked regions of interest (ROI) circumscrib-
ing the areas of fingerprint alterations. Local patches over-
lapping with manually marked ROI are labelled as altered
patches, while the rest are labelled as valid. The test phase
is fully automatic and does not require any manual markup.
such as mirroring, random cropping, and rotation have been
employed to increase the size of the training data.
4.2. Altered Fingerprint Localization
To localize and highlight the altered regions of finger-
prints, we augment our whole image based altered finger-
print detection with a patch-based approach. Our approach
is as follows: First, region of interest (ROI) is manually
marked for 1, 182 randomly selected altered fingerprints
from our database of 4, 815 altered fingerprints. See Fig-
ure 4. Next, local patches of size 96 × 96 centered around
each extracted minutia are cropped. Local patches with
more than 50% overlap with the manually marked ROI are
labelled as altered patches, and the remaining patches are
labelled as valid. Because a majority of fingerprint alter-
ations generate discontinuities and noisy regions in the fric-
tion ridge pattern, a much higher number of spurious minu-
tiae are generated in altered fingerprints compared to valid
fingerprints of the same size [4]. Local patches centered
around minutiae have also shown to provide superior perfor-
mance in fingerprint spoof detection compared to patches
extracted in a raster scan manner [15]. A total of 81, 969
valid and 89, 979 altered patches are extracted and utilized
Figure 5: Examples of altered fingerprint localization by
our proposed method. Local regions highlighted in red rep-
resent the altered portion of the fingerprint, whereas regions
highlighted in green reflect the valid friction ridge area.
for training two different networks: Inception-v3 [16] and
MobileNet-v1 [17]. Fig. 5 presents examples of altered fin-
gerprint localization output by the proposed approach. An
overview of the proposed approach to detect and localize
altered fingerprints is presented in Figure 6.
4.3. Fingerprint image quality analysis
Figure 7 shows distribution of NFIQ 2.0 [18, 19] scores
for the altered and valid fingerprint images used in this
study. NFIQ 2.0 software reads a fingerprint image, com-
putes a set of quality features from the image, and uses these
features to predict the utility of the image as an integer score
between 0 and 100. About 75% of altered fingerprints have
a NFIQ 2.0 score of 40 or lower, and only 10% of images
have a NFIQ 2.0 score larger than 50. The median NFIQ 2.0
score is 23 for altered fingerprints, and 48 for valid. This
suggests that NFIQ 2.0 may be suited to detect altered fin-
gerprints.
Figure 6: An overview of the proposed approach for detection and localization of altered fingerprints. We trained two
convolutional neural networks (Inception-v3 and Mobilenet-v1) using full fingerprint images and local patches of images
where patches are centered on minutiae locations.
Figure 7: Histogram of NFIQ 2.0 quality scores for valid
(green) and altered (red) fingerprint images. Approxi-
mately, 75% of altered fingerprint images have a NFIQ 2.0
score of 40 or lower, and only 10% of altered dataset has
a NFIQ 2.0 score of larger than 50. The median NFIQ
2.0 score for altered fingerprint images is 23, while me-
dian NFIQ 2.0 score for valid fingerprint images is 48. This
suggests NFIQ 2.0’s suitability for detecting altered finger-
prints, particularly for cases of fingerprint obliteration.
4.4. Deep learning for detecting altered fingerprints
Using the code in [20], we were able to train MobileNet-
v1 [17] and Inception-v3 [16] networks as binary classifiers
(altered vs. valid fingerprints). The input is a full fingerprint
image and the output is a probability (or score) of belonging
to Altered or Valid class, referred to as alteration score. A
valid fingerprint image should result in an alteration score of
close to 0, whereas an altered fingerprint image should re-
sult in an alteration score of close to 1. The network hyper-
parameters used to train the CNN models are presented in
Table 2: Network hyper-paramters utilized in training CNN
and GAN models.
Hyper-
paramters Inception-v3 MobileNet-v1 DC-GAN
Batch Size 32 100 64
Optimizer RMSProp RMSProp Adam
Learning Rate [0.01 - 0.0001];exp. decay 0.94
[0.01 - 0.0001];
exp. decay 0.94 0.0002
Momentum 0.9 0.9 0.5
Iterations 25,000 25,000 1,350
Table 2.
4.5. Generating synthetic altered fingerprints
One major constraint of studies on altered fingerprint de-
tection is the limited amount of altered fingerprint images
available. This limitation is perhaps the cause of relatively
few investigations on this topic. To remedy the issue of lim-
ited available data, we trained a Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GAN) that generates altered fingerprints. We used
the DC-GAN architecture1 proposed in [21]. See Figure 8.
We utilized all of the 4, 815 altered fingerprint images for
training by cropping them to 512× 512 pixels. The trained
model outputs 256 × 256 synthetic altered fingerprint im-
ages2. The network hyper-parameters used to train the GAN
model are presented in Table 2.
Generation of synthetic altered fingerprint is a related but
separate topic than detection of altered fingerprint as dis-
cussed in Section 4.4. Our motivation was to investigate
ways to remedy the lack of publicly available altered fin-
gerprint data for research.
5. Experimental Results
5.1. Altered fingerprint detection and localization
Figure 9 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves for the proposed altered fingerprint detec-
1https://github.com/carpedm20/DCGAN-tensorflow
2To avoid the fast convergence of the discriminator network, the gener-
ator network is updated twice for each discriminator network update
Figure 8: Architecture of DC-GAN used to generate synthetic altered fingerprint images. Source: Radford, et al. [21].
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 465
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
False Accept Rate (%)
Tr
ue
 A
cc
ep
t R
at
e 
(%
)
 
 
Th. @ 2% FAR
Inception−v3
MobileNet−v1
Yoon et al.
Figure 9: Performance curves for the proposed altered
fingerprint detection approach utilizing Inception-v3 and
MobileNet-v1 CNN models. Yoon et al. [4] (baseline)
achieved a TDR of 70% @ FDR = 2% on 4,433 altered
fingerprints, while the proposed approach achieves a TDR
(over five folds) of 99.24%± 0.58% @ FDR = 2% on 4,815
altered fingerprints.
tion approach (Inception-v3 and MobileNet-v1) compared
with state-of-the-art [4]. The red curve shows the ac-
curacy of the Inception-v3 implementation and the blue
curve shows the accuracy of the MobileNet-v1 implementa-
Figure 10: Alteration score histograms for valid and altered
fingerprints obtained by the proposed approach using the
best performing Inception-v3 model. The small overlap be-
tween the valid and altered score distributions is an indica-
tion of high discrimination power of the model. Note that
the Y-axis is presented in log scale.
tion. Inception-v3 outperforms MobileNet-v1 architecture
(∼99% to ∼92%), while the computational requirement3
for MobileNet-v1 (6 ms) is almost 10 times lower compared
to time required by the Inception-v3 architecture (50 ms).
3We utilized NVIDIA GTX 1080 Ti GPU to run our implementation of
Inception-v3 and MobileNet-V1 based altered fingerprint detection.
Figure 11: Example classifications and their alteration
scores output by the proposed approach. (a) and (d) present
correctly classified images, while (b) and (c) present incor-
rect classifications. (b) a valid fingerprint that receives a
high alteration score primarily due to the noisy region on
the right. (c) contains a small region of alteration which is
similar to the noise present in valid fingerprints.
The superior performance of Inception-v3 over Mobilenet-
v1 network can be attributed to (i) deeper convolutional net-
work providing higher discrimination power, and (ii) larger
input image size; 299 × 299 for Inception-v3, compared to
224 × 224 for Mobilenet-v1. Both network models show
better detection performance than Yoon and Jain [4] which
had a true detection rate of only 70.2% at a false positive
rate of 2%. Figure 10 shows the histograms of scores pro-
duced by our Inception-v3 model for valid and altered fin-
gerprint images. The very small overlap of the two distribu-
tions is an indication of the high accuracy of our model. We
further investigated the images that were incorrectly labeled
by our model according to the ground truth labels given at
the time of training. Our visual inspection of these images
suggests that some of images labeled as valid, look like al-
tered fingerprints. This might be either due to intentional
alteration or cases of poor quality where fingerprint charac-
teristics are degraded because of age or occupation (brick-
layers, for example, are known to have poor quality finger-
prints because their skin is severely damaged). On the other
hand, some of the images labeled as altered, have a rela-
tively small portion of the image as altered and most parts of
Figure 12: Example images with possible groundtruth la-
beling error. (a) Incorrectly labeled as altered, and (b) in-
correctly labelled as valid. The Inception-v3 model outputs
an alteration score of 0.20 and 0.97 for (a) and (b), respec-
tively, indicating (a) as valid and (b) as altered.
the image look valid. If our model classifies these so called
altered fingerprints as valid fingerprint images, it may not
be far from truth. Example images of correct and incorrect
classification by the Inception-v3 model are shown in Fig-
ure 11 along with the scores generated by our model. Ex-
amples of incorrect groundtruth label are shown in Figure
12.
To evaluate the localization of fingerprint alterations, a
two-fold cross validation is performed. Two Inception-v3
networks are trained using 81, 969 valid and 89, 979 altered
patches, achieving an average EER of 8.5%.
5.2. Generating synthetic altered fingerprints
A total of 4, 060 synthetic altered fingerprint images are
generated using the GAN model discussed in Section 4.5.
Figure 13 presents example images of synthetically gener-
ated altered fingerprints, compared with operational finger-
print images. The distribution of NFIQ 2.0 quality scores
for synthetically generated altered, operational altered, and
valid fingerprint images are shown in Figure 14. The NFIQ
2.0 score distribution of synthetically generated altered fin-
gerprints have large overlap with the distribution of oper-
ational altered fingerprints. The mean NFIQ 2.0 quality
score for synthetic altered, altered, and valid fingerprint im-
ages are 11, 27, and 46, respectively. The low NFIQ 2.0
quality scores for synthetic altered fingerprint images can
be attributed to the noisy friction ridge structure mimicked
by the GAN, as well as the low resolution of the GAN
output. As the training dataset is limited, a lower resolu-
tion for synthetic altered fingerprints is selected to avoid
over-fitting. The synthetic altered fingerprint images are
256 × 256 pixels, while the operational altered fingerprint
images are 750 × 800 pixels. This generator is our first at-
Figure 13: Example images of synthetic altered fingerprint images generated by the proposed GAN, compared to the opera-
tional altered fingerprint images.
Figure 14: NFIQ 2.0 quality score distributions for 4,060
synthetically generated altered (yellow), 4,815 altered (red),
and 4,815 valid fingerprint images (green). The mean NFIQ
2.0 quality scores for synthetic altered, operational altered,
and operational valid fingerprint images are 11, 27, and 46,
respectively.
tempt at solving the limited availability of altered finger-
print datasets, and requires further refining to match the
characteristics between generated and true altered finger-
prints, which we will pursue as a future work.
6. Conclusions and Future work
A robust and accurate method for altered fingerprint de-
tection is critical to ensure the security of widely deployed
AFIS in a variety of government and commercial applica-
tions. In this study, we have trained a CNN model using
operational datasets of 4, 815 altered and 4, 815 valid fin-
gerprint images for altered fingerprint detection. Addition-
ally, we trained another model using minutia-centered lo-
cal patches to automatically localize the regions of finger-
print alterations. Our altered fingerprint detection model
achieves a True Detection Rate (TDR) of 99.24% @ False
Detection Rate (FDR) of 1%, compared to the previous stat-
of-the-art result of TDR = 70% at FDR = 2% which used
a smaller operational dataset. Finally, we trained a GAN,
using the operational altered fingerprint database, to gener-
ate synthetic altered fingerprint images with similar char-
acteristics as that of operational database. The syntheti-
cally generated altered fingerprint database will be open-
sourced to alleviate the limited availability of altered finger-
print database and encourage further research on this topic.
In future, we plan to perform an analysis of pre- and post-
altered fingerprint images of the same finger to benchmark
the effect of alteration on recognition accuracy. We will
also refine the GAN network to improve the characteristics
of synthetic altered fingerprints, control the type of alter-
ation, and use fingerprint comparison scores to assess the
goodness of fit for our proposed synthetic altered fingerprint
generation model.
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